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Trade Union Organizing Free from Employers’  
Interference: Evidence from Vietnam
Trinh Ly Khanh*
In recent years, Vietnamese trade unions have made considerable strides in trade 
union organizing.  However, studies show that workplace trade unions are generally 
dominated and controlled by employers.  Increasing labor unrest, particularly in the 
private sector, reveals the failure of trade union organizing and operation in Vietnam. 
This article aims to provide a picture of trade union organizing as conducted by the 
communist Vietnamese trade union system in the private sector, particularly trade 
union organizing that is free from employers’ interference.  It also examines whether 
the new legal framework may contribute to this form of trade union organizing in 
the near future.
Keywords: Party-led trade unions, trade union organizing,  
employers’ interference, anti-unionism, Vietnam
Introduction
The reforms (doi moi) initiated in 1986 by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to 
transform a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy has created sig-
nificant changes in the Vietnamese labor market.  Before the innovation most people of 
working age were employed in state agencies or state-owned enterprises.  Today, the 
majority of the employed population works for the private sector (approximately 41 mil-
lion persons are employed in local enterprises and approximately 1.6 million persons are 
employed in foreign-invested enterprises) (Vietnam, General Statistics Office [GSO] 
2010).  Vietnam still has a socialist political system and trade union policy: the Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is the only trade union.  Workplace trade unions 
(công đoàn cơ sở), immediate upper-level trade unions (công đoàn cấp trên trực tiếp cơ 
sở), and other trade unions of different levels must follow the Statute of VGCL.  Workers 
from different sectors have the right to voluntarily form, join, or participate in trade 
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unions in accordance with the law.  The trade unions are open to Vietnamese salaried 
workers and self-employed Vietnamese,1) irrespective of their occupation, gender, or 
religious belief.  However, they are only entitled to form, join, or participate in trade 
unions affiliated with the VGCL2) since independent trade unions operating outside the 
umbrella of the VGCL are not legally recognized.3)  The change in labor structure has led 
to a shift in the VGCL’s focus regarding union organizing in the private sector, dominated 
(97 percent) by small and medium enterprises (Tự Cường 2012).  In 2003, the VGCL set 
a target to gain 1 million new trade union members in the period 2003–08 and 1.5 million 
new trade union members in the period 2008–13.  Accordingly, by the end of 2013, work-
place trade unions should be established in 70 percent of the eligible enterprises under 
the provisions of the VGCL Statute, gathering at least 60 percent of the workers (Nguyễn 
Duy Vũ 2012).  By the end of 2011, the number of new trade union members had increased 
by over 1.3 million.  This brought the total number of trade union members in the whole 
country to over 7.5 million, scattered over 111,319 workplace trade unions, of which the 
private sector accounts for 74.2 percent (ibid.).
Despite the sharp rise in trade union memberships and trade union organizing, there 
has been a constant increase in wildcat strikes4) since the enforcement of the first Labour 
Code of 1994, which came into effect on January 1, 1995.5)  According to VGCL’s statistics, 
in the period 1995–2010, there were 3,402 wildcat strikes (Vietnam, VGCL 2011b, 32). 
The global economic recession led to thousands of workers losing their jobs in 2011.  The 
number of wildcat strikes that year (978 cases) was double that of 2010, concentrated in 
foreign-invested enterprises in the key economic provinces and cities in the south (Quang 
Chính and Việt Lâm 2012).  The percentage of wildcat strikes occurring in organized 
enterprises is high, for example, 70.99 percent in 2010 (ibid., 36).  Current practices of 
trade union organizing is one of the major causes of wildcat strikes.  Despite the increase 
of workplace trade unions over the years, several established workplace trade unions are 
1) During the revision process of the Trade Union Law of 1990, a proposal was submitted to enable 
foreign workers working in Vietnam to join trade unions affiliated to the VGCL, as mentioned in 
Article 5 of the latest draft 10 of the Trade Union Law proposal of April 30, 2012.  However, this 
proposal was not accepted and the Trade Union Law of 2012 still excludes the right to trade unions 
of foreign workers in Vietnam.
2) Article 5 of the Trade Union Law of 2012 and Article 1 of the VGCL Statute amended in 2013.
3) Article 4, Section 1, Section 2; and Article 7 of the Trade Union Law of 2012, approved by the 
National Assembly on June 20, 2012 and effective from January 1, 2013, replacing the Trade Union 
Law of 1990.
4) This refers to strikes that are not organized and led by workplace trade unions and which are carried 
out without respecting legal procedures.
5) The Labour Code of 1994 has been replaced by the Labour Code of 2012, which was approved by 
the National Assembly on June 18, 2012 and took effect from May 1, 2013.
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in fact “yellow unions,” formed and influenced by the management of the enterprises in 
order to serve the employers’ interests (see the following sections for more details).  In 
the face of increasing wildcat strikes, the VGCL has attempted to conduct trade union 
organizing free from employers’ interference in the private sector.  This effort, which is 
seen as a pilot initiative, has been carried out in a small number of targeted private-
sector enterprises in Hai Phong city, Binh Duong province and Ho Chi Minh City since 
2011.6)  These are representative localities in terms of a high concentration of private-
sector enterprises, a large workforce, and a high percentage of wildcat strikes.  The aim 
of this effort is to establish trade unions with democratic participation of workers, based 
on a bottom-up principle of organizing and minimal influence of employers in the process.
On the one hand, from a structural perspective, the VGCL faces the challenge of 
reforming its organizational structure in order to gain greater operating independence 
and better adapt to the global situation of trade unions and the trade union movement. 
During the revision process of the Trade Union Law of 1990, initiated since 2009, it was 
proposed that the Communist Party’s leadership in the trade union movement be 
removed, as clearly mentioned in draft 10 of the proposal of April 30, 2012.  However, 
Article 1 of the current Trade Union Law of 2012 reaffirms the leadership of the Com-
munist Party over Vietnamese trade unions.  On the other hand, Vietnamese trade unions 
have gained more benefits from the Trade Union Law of 2012, for example: legal protec-
tion for trade union officers; intervention of immediate upper-level trade unions in non-
unionized enterprises; increase of trade union contributions from employers, etc. (see 
infra).
This article explores how the VGCL conducts trade union organizing in the contem-
porary Vietnamese industrial context.  It explains how employers are able to influence 
trade union organizing and operations at the workplace level, and outlines the organiza-
tional challenges faced by trade unions in implementing reform.  Using the example of a 
few cases where trade union organizing is free from employers’ interference, the difficul-
ties of operating such trade unions is discussed.  The article also reflects the changes 
and potential impact of the new Labour Code of 2012 and the Trade Union Law of 2012 
6) This initiative was regulated by Decision No. 953/QD, dated July 20, 2010 of the Presidium of 
VGCL on the creation of pilot working groups to innovate trade union organizing and the 
establishment of trade unions, and to improve the linkage between upper-level trade unions and 
workplace trade unions and workers; comprehensive Plan No. 2202/KH-TLD, dated December 27, 
2010 of the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour on the implementation of the pilot program 
to innovate trade union organizing and improve the linkage between upper-level trade unions and 
workplace trade unions.  This initiative was implemented in Binh Duong province on December 31, 
2012, as mentioned in Plan No. 13/KH-TLD, June 22, 2012 of the Vietnam General Confederation 
of Labour.
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on trade union organizing.
This article is derived from the personal observations of the author garnered after 
years of involvement in the operation of the VGCL and its initiatives in independent trade 
union organizing, as well as participation in different seminars and group discussions 
among trade unions of different levels and other stakeholders such as the Ministry of 
Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (VCCI), etc.  The article also draws on documentation on relevant policies and 
legal acts.
Current Trade Union Organizing Practices
Traditional Practices of Trade Union Organizing
It is immediate upper-level trade unions instead of rank-and-file workers that take the 
initiative in establishing workplace trade unions.  According to a survey conducted by 
the VGCL, more than 99 percent of workplace trade unions are established by upper-
level trade unions (Vietnam, VGCL and International Labour Organization [ILO] Indus-
trial Relations Project 2012, 16).  This usually takes one to three months (45.5 percent) 
or three to six months (32.7 percent) (ibid., 13).
The immediate upper-level trade union first conducts surveys on the situation of 
enterprises and workers in the target areas in order to identify enterprises suitable for 
union organizing.  These surveys are conducted in coordination with the relevant author-
ities: planning and investment departments, labor departments, invalids and social affairs 
departments, tax departments, management committees of industrial zones, etc. (ibid., 
25).  As soon as the surveys are completed, the immediate upper-level trade union con-
tacts the employers in writing to propose a meeting.  If the enterprises do not respond, 
the union sends another letter or tries to make direct contact (ibid.).  If the union’s 
proposal is not accepted by the employers, trade union officers cannot access the enter-
prises and workers cannot leave the production site to meet them (Nguyễn Ngọc Trung 
2012).  If the enterprises agree with the proposal, an official response is sent and a meet-
ing is arranged at the companies’ premises (ibid., 16).
During the meeting, trade union officers meet the workers and expound the neces-
sity and benefits of joining trade unions.  They instruct the workers on how to apply for 
membership and nominate members of the temporary executive committees of the work-
place trade unions after discussion with the enterprise’s directors.  Next the enterprise 
management, together with the upper-level trade union and the temporary executive 
committee, prepares and organizes a ceremony for member admission and creation of 
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the trade union (ibid., 25–26).  The decision on forming a workplace trade union and the 
nomination of its temporary executive committee, issued by the upper-level trade union, 
is based on the employer’s recommendation (Nguyễn Văn Bình 2011, 13).
How Employers Interfere in Trade Union Organizing
As analyzed above, upper-level trade unions are too dependent on the goodwill of employ-
ers in the organization of workplace trade unions.  If employers deny the upper-level 
trade unions access to their premises to conduct a campaign for their workers, the trade 
union organizing is considered a failure.  Moreover, there has been a misinterpretation 
for many years now of the VGCL’s procedure concerning the application dossiers for 
starting workplace trade unions.  The VGCL does not require the employers’ signature 
in the application dossier submitted to the immediate upper-level trade unions.  In prac-
tice, however, the unions often request the enterprises and workers to provide the 
employer’s signature in the application letter, which includes the recommended list of 
the temporary executive committees of the workplace trade unions.7)  This signature is 
taken as proof of the employers’ commitment to create favorable conditions for the 
operation of trade unions in their enterprises (Nguyễn Văn Bình 2011, 15).
Trade union activity is still heavily influenced by the centrally planned economy 
period where there was no conflict of interests between the employers and workers in 
state-owned enterprises.  The VGCL does not prohibit the management of a company 
from joining its trade union or from holding leadership positions in the union, for example, 
as president or members of the executive committee.  The VGCL has taken measures 
to correct this anomaly.  On May 6, 2009, the Presidium of VGCL promulgated Guidance 
No. 703/HD-TLD, Item 1.2, Chapter I, banning the owner(s), president, and/or deputy 
president of the governing board; general director and/or deputy general director; direc-
tors and/or deputy directors of a private-sector enterprise from joining its trade union. 
However, this ban does not apply to other persons from the management, notably, heads 
and/or deputy heads of functional departments and production workshops, etc.  Indeed, 
a survey shows that 60–70 percent of workplace trade union presidents hold managerial 
positions within the company (ibid.).
7) See the instructions (in Vietnamese) of immediate upper-level trade unions, e.g., Federation of 
Labour of District 1, Ho Chi Minh City: http://www.ldldq1hcm.gov.vn/thutucthanhlapcongdoan.aspx 
(accessed October 3, 2013); Federation of Labour of Binh Tan District, Ho Chi Minh City: http://
ldldbinhtanhcm.gov.vn/vn/default.aspx?cat_id=806 (accessed October 3, 2013); Trade Union of 
the Industrial Zones of Ha Nam province: http://hanam.gov.vn/vi-vn/bqlckcn/Pages/Article.aspx? 
ChannelId=39&articleID=60 (accessed October 3, 2013), etc. for more details of the procedures 
for establishing workplace trade unions.
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Members of the management who became trade union members before the promul-
gation of Guidance No. 703/HD-TLD automatically lose their trade union membership 
status, but the VGCL has no regulation preventing them from becoming honorary trade 
union members and participating in trade union activities.8)  Consequently, this allows 
employers to continue participating in trade union activities and monitoring and influ-
encing its operation.  Moreover, employers are statutorily required to make a financial 
contribution to the trade union on a monthly basis.  This requirement was equal to 2 
percent of the workers’ salary fund, which is used as the basis for social insurance con-
tribution, and was applied in both state-owned and in private-sector enterprises.  In 
foreign-invested enterprises, this amount was equivalent to 1 percent of the total wage 
budget.9)  Since January 1, 2013 this amount has been amended to 2 percent of the total 
workers’ salary fund for all organizations and enterprises of both the public and private 
sector.10)  This legal provision formally creates room for the employers to dominate and 
control workplace trade unions, which is inconsistent with Article 2 of the ILO Conven-
tion No. 98, to which Vietnam is not a signatory.
Before the formulation of the Labour Code of 2012 and the Trade Union Law of 2012, 
the Vietnamese government carried out a study on the compatibility of Vietnamese laws 
with Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining of the Inter-
national Labour Organization.  The study showed that parts of Vietnamese laws were 
incompatible with the Convention, particularly provisions on the independence of trade 
unions (Vietnam, MOLISA 2012, 48).  With the promulgation of the Trade Union Law of 
2012, which restricts the independence of trade unions, the possibility of joining Conven-
tion No. 98 is vague in the near future.
Another reason the trade union system facilitates employers’ interference in trade 
union organizing arises from the VGCL’s target of developing trade union membership. 
There have been numerous cases where the principle of voluntary participation of work-
ers has been ignored during the process of workplace trade union establishment, as 
acknowledged by VGCL (Vietnam, VGCL 2010, 16).  Moreover, due to the shortage of 
upper-level trade union officers with experience in leading the organizing process in 
private-sector enterprises, the process does not always match the enterprises’ needs, 
and the methods and contents of the campaigns do not leave the workers convinced.11)
8) Items 1.3 and 1.4 of Guidance No. 703/HD-TLD prohibit honorary trade union members from voting 
in meetings and congresses or from holding leadership positions at any level.
9) Article 2b of Circular No. 76/1999/TTLT/BTC-TLDLDVN and Section 3a of Circular No. 17/2009/
TT-BTC.
10) Article 26, Section 2 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
11) Section 1, Resolution No. 07/NQ-TLD, dated July 18, 2008 on development and strengthening the 
capacity of trade unions in small and medium enterprises.
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Trade Union Organizing Free from Employers’ Interference
Since 2011 the VGCL has initiated innovative ways of organizing trade unions in the 
private sector in the localities mentioned above.  What is new is that the trade union 
organizing is conducted by the immediate upper-level trade unions outside the enter-
prises’ premises and outside working hours.  Officers of immediate upper-level trade 
unions approach workers of targeted enterprises in order to learn about their working 
conditions (the total number of workers, wages, issues with management, etc.).  The 
officers try at the same time to select focal workers who can influence the other workers 
to join the trade unions.12)  Leaflets about trade unions and the rights and obligations of 
trade union members are distributed to the workers.  Other services such as legal aid, 
sports and entertainment activities, etc. are organized to improve the relations between 
immediate upper-level trade unions and the workers (Vietnam, VGCL and ILO Industrial 
Relations Project 2012, 8).
Once it receives the application letters of at least five workers, the immediate upper-
level trade union issues a decision to admit the workers into the trade union.  Members 
of the temporary executive committee for the new trade union are voted in directly by 
the trade union members and officers help to organize meetings for members on trade 
union operation.  Only after all this has been put in place are the employers informed 
(ibid., 9, 10).
Trade Union Responses to Employers’ Interference
Case 1: Company K (Vietnam, VGCL and ILO Industrial Relations Project 2012, 21–22)13)
In 2007, Ms L, a staff of the human resources department was elected as the union 
president.  The management asked her not to approach workers at the workplace; instead, 
they suggested that the workers go and see her at the human resource department if 
needed.  Ms L did not agree and continued meeting workers at their workplace when 
necessary.  In early 2011, as the trade union was preparing for its congress in the new 
term, the management opposed Ms L’s occupation of the position of trade union president 
and prepared a list nominating members of the executive committee—excluding Ms L. 
She was then forced by the management to put the stamp of the executive committee on 
this document.  When the upper-level union learnt about this case, it issued a decision 
to cancel the congress and reorganize another one.
12) This is a summary of the innovative organizing approach implemented by trade unions in the eco-
nomic zones of Hai Phong city; the industrial zones and processing zones of Binh Duong province, 
and the Federation of Labour of District 12, Ho Chi Minh City in 2011.  The author has participated 
in these activities alongside the trade unions.
13) Summarized by the author.
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Case 2: Dong A Vina Company (Đức Minh 2012)14)
Dong A Vina is a 100 percent foreign-invested company in Binh Duong industrial zone, 
Di An, Binh Duong province, employing 530 workers.  Mr Tran Van Sy, head of the 
production section, was elected as a member of the company trade union’s executive 
committee at the trade union congress.
After his election, Mr Sy went on leave.  When he came back to work, the human 
resource department launched a procedure to dismiss him on the grounds that he had 
returned to work a few days late without a valid reason.  To protest against this unjust 
decision, 512 workers of the company went on strike on July 12, 2012, demanding that 
Mr Sy be reinstated and that the officers of the human resource department responsible 
for this decision be dismissed instead.
Representatives of the trade union of Binh Duong industrial zones and the manage-
ment board of Binh Duong industrial zone (the local authority) came to the company to 
try to resolve the dispute.  On July 23–24, 2012, approximately 30 representatives of the 
workers, including the executive committees of the workplace trade unions and heads 
of the production groups and production lines, were invited to attend a conciliation meet-
ing with the company management.  The company agreed to pay Mr Sy benefits if his 
dismissal was found to be illegal.  The workers’ demands that the staff of the human 
resources department involved be dismissed and that the strikers be paid 70 percent of 
their wages for the days they did not work were denied by the company.
At the end of the meeting, the representative of the workplace trade union promised 
to encourage the workers to come back to work on July 25, 2012.  However, the workers 
refused and stuck by their earlier demands.  The company then dismissed all 512 work-
ers on the grounds that they had been absent from work for over five days without valid 
reasons.
The above examples show a commitment from certain immediate upper-level trade 
unions to prevent employers’ interference in the organizing of non-“yellow” trade unions 
in the workplace.  It demonstrates that not all workplace trade unions in the private sec-
tor are “yellow unions” and that not all upper-level trade unions ignore the problems 
faced by workplace trade unions.  It also shows that effective linkage and communication 
between the upper-level and workplace trade unions can be effective in limiting employ-
ers’ interference.
At the central level, in order to counter anti-unionism by employers, the VGCL has 
implemented some measures, including the establishment of a fund to support workplace 
14) Summarized by the author.
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trade union delegates (presidents, deputy presidents, executive committee members) 
who are victims of anti-union actions by their employers.  This applies to delegates who 
have been illegally dismissed or transferred to a position that does not meet their skill 
level or one that pays 30 percent less than their current salary.  Concretely, this support 
entails the following:15)
• Financial support, equal to the minimum wage, for two months immediately after 
the termination of the labor contract.
• Monthly support, equivalent to the minimum wage, for 1.5 months during the 
period of unemployment, not exceeding 6 months.
• When a labor dispute between a trade union delegate and the enterprise’s manage-
ment is brought to court, the fund will cover 50–100 percent of the delegate’s 
court fees, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Key Challenges for Trade Union Organizing Free from Employers’ 
 Interference
Challenges within the Trade Union System
The traditional method of union organizing, whereby workplace trade unions are depend-
ent on employers, has been carried out for years.  This has become ingrained in upper-
level union officers and is hard to change (Vietnam, VGCL and ILO Industrial Relations 
Project 2012, 33).
In addition, trade union organizing free from employers’ interference requires con-
siderable effort in terms of policy commitment, time, human resources, and finance.  The 
first challenge for upper-level trade unions is the imbalance in staff and workload.  As 
communist trade unions, the VGCL and its affiliated trade unions are tasked with many 
jobs that are not directly related to the function of trade unions, as compared with con-
ventional trade unions in other countries.  These include involvement in politics and the 
organization of socio-cultural, humanitarian, sports, and recreational activities.  Yet they 
face a shortage of officers, particularly qualified officers, because they do not have a free 
hand in deciding the number of trade union officers (see infra) .
On average, immediate upper-level trade unions comprise two or three full-time 
trade union officers.  Trade unions in industrial zones generally comprise four full-time 
trade union officers (ibid., 1, 3).  The number may increase for some trade unions in the 
15) Article 7, Article 8, and Article 19 of Decision No. 1521/QD-TLD, dated September 29, 2006 of the 
VGCL Presidium, regulating the establishment, organization, and operation management of the 
workplace trade union delegate support fund.
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industrial zones of key economic localities.  Table 1 shows the number of trade union 
officers in three economic hubs in South Vietnam: Binh Duong, Dong Nai, and Ho Chi 
Minh City (ILO 2012, 14).
Table 1 reveals the disproportionate division of work between the technical officers, 
who are directly responsible for trade union organizing, and the administrative officers. 
For example, there are 3 technical officers versus 6 administrative staff in the trade union 
of the industrial zones of Binh Duong; 12 technical officers versus 6 administrative staff 
for Ho Chi Minh City; and 5 technical officers versus 7 administrative staff for Dong Nai 
province.
Table 1 also shows the huge workload shouldered by the technical officers, given 
the big number of enterprises, workplace trade unions, and trade union members under 
their charge.  Furthermore, it also shows up the imbalance in workload among the tech-
nical officers of the three localities.  In Binh Duong, there are only three officers for 490 
enterprises, 318 workplace trade unions, and 120,000 trade union members (this equates 
to one officer taking charge of 163 enterprises, 106 workplace trade unions, and 40,000 
trade union members).  Meanwhile, in Ho Chi Minh City, 12 officers are responsible for 
800 enterprises, 724 workplace trade unions, and 179,000 trade union members (or one 
officer for 66 enterprises, 60 workplace trade unions, and 14,916 trade union members). 
In Dong Nai province, five officers are allocated for 369 enterprises, 350 workplace trade 
unions, and 130,000 trade union members (that is, one officer for 74 enterprises, 70 
workplace trade unions, and 26,000 trade union members).
As mentioned above, the tasks of these trade union officers include many non- 
traditional activities.  This work accounts for 14.18 percent of their workload (Vietnam, 
VGCL and ILO Industrial Relations Project 2012, 14).  This is in addition to participa-
tion in political affairs not directly related to trade union activities, for example, with the 
Party, state authorities (People’s Councils and People’s Committees), Women’s Union, 







Ho Chi Minh City 
Industrial Zones 
Trade Union
No. of  
full-time  
officers
Technical officers 3 5 12
Administrative staff 6 7 6
Total 9 12 18
No. of enterprises 490 369 800
No. of workplace trade unions 318 350 724
No. of workers 140,000 160,000 273,000
No. of union members 120,000 130,000 179,000
Source: ILO (2012, 14).
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Veterans’ Union, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, which account for 14.74 
percent of their workload, according to a survey conducted by the VGCL (ibid., 10, 14).
As shown in the case studies above, there is evidence of anti-unionism committed 
by employers against workplace trade union delegates.  However, a survey by the VGCL 
(ibid., 13) shows that this is not taken into serious consideration by upper-level trade 
union officers.  This exposes the weakness of the trade union system in protecting their 
union officers.  In the case of the Dong A Vina Company above, no systematic measures 
were put in place by the trade union of Binh Duong industrial zones to protect the work-
place trade union officer.  The company very clearly interfered in the operations of the 
trade union by victimizing the trade union officer.  Yet his dismissal was not handled any 
differently than an ordinary case of dismissal and no special measure was taken to coun-
ter these acts of discrimination.  Moreover, all the workers who went on strike to show 
their support for Mr Sy and their dissatisfaction with the company were “persuaded” by 
the company to sign an agreement terminating their contracts.  This constituted a major 
anti-union act targeting the trade union members, yet the trade union of Binh Duong 
industrial zones did not put up any opposition.
Challenges from the Workers’ Side
Reports show that young workers account for the majority of the private-sector work-
force.  Most of them are unskilled workers, with unskilled workers who have not received 
any vocational training accounting for 83.54 percent (Ban Mai 2013).  A large number are 
also migrant workers who work for enterprises in industrial zones and processing zones, 
for example, 30 percent of the workforce in Ho Chi Minh City, one of the biggest indus-
trial hubs in Vietnam with approximately eight million inhabitants, is made up of migrants 
from other provinces and cities (Vietnam, Centre for Industrial Relations Development 
[CIRD] 2012, 3).
A survey by the Binh Duong trade union of 38 enterprises in industrial zones shows 
that workers’ wages are often too low: 76.8 percent has a monthly income of VND 
2,000,000–3,000,000 (equivalent to EUR 66–100 or USD 94–142), which is insufficient 
for a living; and 76.6 percent of workers has no savings at all (91.7 percent of them can-
not afford a house and must rent an apartment).  A large number of workers must work 
overtime16)—up to 50 hours/month (66 percent) or 50–100 hours (31 percent) (Lê Nho 
16) Article 106, Section 2b of the Labour Code of 2012 provides that supplementary working hours of 
the workers shall not exceed 50 percent of the normal working hours in a day.  Regulation for weekly 
work provides that the sum of normal working hours and overtime working hours shall not exceed 
12 hours per day, and the sum of overtime working hours shall not exceed 30 hours per month and 
200 hours per year.  In special cases, this can be extended to but not exceed 300 hours per year.
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Lượng 2011).17)
The situation is similar in Hanoi city.  Most workers in the Hanoi industrial zones 
have to work overtime because of low wages (Phong Cầm 2011).  As such, they do not 
have much time for trade union organizing.  Some are also reluctant to join for fear of 
being discriminated against by their employers.  Yet others do not join because they 
constantly change work in search of higher salaries and better working conditions (ibid., 
18).
Challenges from the Employers’ Side
Case 1: Yoneda Vietnam Company (Phong Cầm 2011, 3–6)18)
Yoneda Vietnam is a Japanese company producing stationery products in Hai Phong city. 
It employs 225 workers.  In 2007 an unlawful trade union was formed by the employer 
in the name of the workers and “trade union dues” were deducted from the workers’ 
wages.  This came to an end in November 2010, after intervention by the trade union of 
Hai Phong Economic Zones.
The trade union of Hai Phong Economic Zones approached the workers outside the 
company’s premises, and four core workers’ groups based on common interests were 
formed: sports, home fellows, age, and living quarters.  Trade union activities were 
gradually introduced to the meetings of these groups.
Currently, some 243–277 workers have applied to join the trade union and 5 work-
ers have been selected for the temporary executive committee.  To prepare for the 
establishment of the grassroots trade union, the trade union of Hai Phong Economic 
Zones attempted to approach the company director but was turned down.  The company 
director tried instead to divide the workers, instigating them not to join the trade union 
and putting pressure on influential workers.  The contracts of a few of the workers who 
are members of the core workers’ groups have not been renewed upon expiry.
17) Workers may enter into employment contracts with multiple employers as prescribed in Article 30, 
Section 3 of the Labour Code of 1994 amended and supplemented.  However, this issue was regu-
lated in neither the Labour Code of 1994 amended and supplemented nor in Decree No. 44/2003/
ND-CP, dated May 9, 2003, detailing and guiding the implementation of a number of articles of the 
Labour Code on employment contracts.  Things have changed with the promulgation of the Labour 
Code of 2012.  The Vietnamese government has promulgated Decree No. 44/2013/ND-CP of the 
Government dated May 10, 2013, which has taken effect since July 1, 2013.  This decree specifies 
the employees’ participation in social insurance and health insurance, and occupational health and 
safety issues when entering into employment contracts with multiple employers as prescribed in 
Article 4 and Article 5.  It is hoped that the new legal framework will create more opportunities for 
workers to work at different jobs at the same time in order to improve their income situation.
18) Summarized by the author.
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Case 2: Sonics Company (ibid., 9–10)19)
Sonics International Limited Liability is a Taiwanese company producing bicycle parts in 
Binh Duong province.  It employs 120 workers.
After the launch of a new initiative on trade union organizing, the trade union of Binh 
Duong industrial zones approached workers outside the company’s premises to obtain 
more information on the company’s situation.  A core workers’ group was then formed, 
which included three influential workers from the company selected by the trade union. 
The workers’ group is headed by an officer of the trade union.  Members received train-
ing on trade union organization, labor law, trade union law, occupational safety, health, 
etc.  This group is responsible for encouraging other workers in the company to join the 
trade union.
In March 2011, a trade union recruitment ceremony was conducted and 70 workers 
were recruited.  The company director has, however, repeatedly opposed the formation 
of the trade union.  A few months later, in July, the trade union of Binh Duong industrial 
zones issued a decision declaring the establishment of the trade union of Sonics Interna-
tional Limited Liability.  Four members of the formal trade union executive committee 
were also elected.
The company trade union has been hampered in its operations by the uncooperative-
ness of the company director, despite numerous meetings arranged by the trade union 
of Binh Duong industrial zones.  On September 15, 2011, the trade union of Binh Duong 
industrial zones wrote to the management board regarding 11 cases of labor law violations 
committed by the company and requested an inspection of the company.  On October 13 
an inspection team led by the management board of the industrial zones made its way to 
the company.  The trade union of Binh Duong industrial zones nominated its officer to 
join the inspection team.  Via this inspection, the trade union of Binh Duong industrial 
zones formally notified the company of the establishment of the enterprise trade union 
and asked for its cooperation.
However, until now no effort has been made by the company to comply with labor 
law.  No improvement has been made with regards to the trade union activities.  The 
trade union is facing even greater difficulties in running its activities.  Trade union meet-
ings have been forbidden within the company’s premises, including meetings outside 
working hours.  The number of members has been reduced by 42 because some workers 
have left the company, while others have withdrawn their membership because of the 
pressure exerted by the company.  The executive committee of the trade union has been 
similarly affected—three members have left, including one who resigned due to the 
19) Summarized by the author.
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opposition by the company.  The executive committee has managed to keep up with its 
regular meetings; however, other activities, such as recruitment of new members, have 
been neglected.
Case 3: S. C. Johnson & Son Company (ibid., 7–8)20)
A producer of cosmetics, shower gels, etc., S. C. Johnson & Son Company operates in 
Song Than I industrial zone, Binh Duong province and currently employs 300 workers. 
Johnson Mutual Benefit Association (JMBA) was formed by the company to promote the 
welfare of the workers as well as strengthen industrial relations in the company, in keep-
ing with regulations of S. C. Johnson & Son Corporation.  The company has therefore 
rejected the formation of a company trade union.  It has even issued a rule that JMBA 
will provide monthly financial support for each worker—on the condition that he/she does 
not join the trade union.  Those who wish to join the trade union will lose access to dif-
ferent benefits by the company.  As a result, workers in the company do not want to join 
the trade union.  Another obstacle is that the workers are members of other labor-leasing 
companies.  Meanwhile, many of the workers in the company are office workers who live 
in Ho Chi Minh City and travel to work by company transport.  This has made it impos-
sible for the trade union of Binh Duong industrial zones to approach the workers in S. C. 
Johnson & Son Company.
Case 4: F.C. Company (ibid., 20–21)
Ms TT. Ch. was elected in October 2008 as president of the workplace union in F.C. 
Company (a foreign-invested company).  The company director threatened that she would 
not receive her monthly responsibility allowance as a production group leader, amount-
ing to VND 150,000 (equivalent to around EUR 5.8/USD 7), unless she resigned from 
her position as president of the trade union.  According to the director, Ms TT. Ch. could 
not fulfil her production group leader duties if she were to undertake the trade union 
activities; therefore she was not entitled to her allowance.
Ms Ch. was forced to comply and held her union position from October 2008 to the 
end of April 2009.  During this period, the company management kept an eye on her and 
threatened her with disciplinary action should she be found lacking in her duties.
In May 2009, Ms Ch. resigned from her union position.  Only then was she able to 
recover her responsibility allowance and only then did the monitoring and threats of 
sanctioning end.
20) Summarized by the author.
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Case 5: Company F (ibid., 24)
Mr NN. H, who worked as a warehouse assistant, was elected as the president of his 
company union in March 2007.  Mr H organized trade union activities well, winning 
members’ trust.  However, due to active trade union activities, he was discriminated 
against by the management.  In 2009, he lost his position as warehouse assistant and was 
transferred to a rank-and-file worker position.
The above examples illustrate the general behavior of employers towards independent 
trade unions.  These employers attempt to control the trade unions through ploys such 
as promising workplace trade union officers financial benefits and promotions; exerting 
pressure on part-time trade union officers in their normal work; transferring these 
 officers to lower-grade and/or lower-pay positions; excluding trade union members from 
certain benefits enjoyed by non-unionized workers in the company, etc.
Enactment of the New Legal Framework: Light at the End of the Tunnel?
The fact that no labor case related to the right to organize, join, and participate in trade 
union activities has ever been settled by the competent courts (Vietnam, VGCL 2011b, 
8), speaks volumes of the authorities’ failure to deal with anti-unionism.  Moreover, 
workplace trade unions established and operating outside companies’ premises are not 
regulated by the Trade Union Statute or any other relevant regulation,21) leading to the 
denial of their legal status by relevant stakeholders, including the authorities.  This issue 
remains unresolved by the new Trade Union Law of 2012 or the Labour Code of 2012.
As for staffing, there has been no change between the old Trade Union Law and the 
Trade Union Law of 2012.  Full-time trade union officers who work at upper-level trade 
unions are still public cadres and civil servants.22)  The VGCL does not have full autonomy 
in deciding the number and positions of trade union officers.  While it may develop the 
organizational structure of the trade union and positions within, this is still submitted to 
the competent authority,23) which has the ultimate say on the positions and workload of 
21) This is the case of a workplace trade union with 27 members drawn from different small enterprises 
in Tan Thoi Nhat ward, formed by the Federation of Labour of district 12, Ho Chi Minh City in 2011. 
It operates under the direct management of the Federation of Labour of district 12, Ho Chi Minh 
City.
22) Article 4, Section 1, Section 2; and Article 70, Section 2 Law on public cadres and civil servants.
23) The competent authority here refers to the CPV as mentioned in Article 66, Section 6 of the Law 
on public cadres and civil servants approved by the National Assembly, dated November 13, 2008 
and taking effect from January 1, 2010.
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full-time trade union officers.24)  As a result, the disproportionate distribution of workload 
among full-time trade union officers in upper-level trade unions remains unresolved.
Nonetheless, there are some positive changes in the new legal framework concern-
ing trade union organizing.  In order to prevent anti-union practices among employers, 
the Trade Union Law of 2012 prohibits the use of economic measures and other methods 
to interfere in the establishment and operation of trade unions.  The Trade Union Law 
of 2012 also reaffirms the former Trade Union Law of 1990 in prohibiting acts that prevent 
or cause difficulties to the establishment and operation of trade unions, and which dis-
criminate against or disadvantage workers in the establishing or joining of trade unions 
or the undertaking of trade union activities.25)  The new Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP 
imposes stricter sanctions against anti-unionism acts.  The fine for employers who pre-
vent or hamper employees from forming or joining trade unions, or carrying out trade 
union activities, has been increased from VND 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 (EUR 350–524 
or USD 473–710).26)  A fine of VND 5,000,000–10,000,000 (around EUR 175–349 or USD 
237–473) is also imposed on other types of discriminatory acts in the form of working 
hours, wages, etc.27)
The new legal framework reaffirms the role of immediate upper-level trade unions 
in trade union organizing,28) but acknowledges for the first time their rights and respon-
sibilities to approach workers in enterprises.29)  This legal acknowledgment was neces-
sitated by cases in the past years of employers preventing upper-level trade unions 
officers from accessing their premises, as we have seen above.  Henceforth the act of 
preventing trade union officers from entering company premises is liable to a fine rang-
ing from VND 5,000,000–10,000,000 (around EUR 175–349 or USD 237–473).30)
There is another encouraging change in the VGCL’s policy, reflecting signs of decen-
tralization in union organizing.  In addition to the role of the immediate upper-level trade 
unions as mentioned above, the amended VGCL Statute also recognizes the role of rank-
and-file workers in trade union organizing.  Accordingly, workers may establish an orga-
24) Article 23, Section 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
25) Article 9, Section 1, 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
26) Article 24, Section 3 of Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP of the government, dated August 22, 2013, on 
administrative sanctioning in the field of labor, social insurance, and sending Vietnamese workers 
abroad to perform work under the contracts.  This has been in effect since October 10, 2013 and 
replaced Decree No. 47/2010/ND-CP dated May 6, 2010, Decree No. 86/2010/ND-CP dated August 
13, 2010 and Decree No. 144/2007/ND-CP dated September 10, 2007.
27) Article 24, Section 2c of Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP.
28) Article 16, Section 1 of the Trade Union Law of 2012, and Article 189, Section 2 of the Labour Code 
of 2012.
29) Article 16, Section 2 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
30) Article 24, Section 2dd of Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP.
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nizing committee at the workplace, responsible for conducting campaigns, receiving 
workers’ application letters to join the trade union, and preparing for the congress for 
the establishment of the trade union when a sufficient number of members, as prescribed 
by the VGCL’s Statute, has been reached.  Nonetheless, the establishment and operation 
of the workplace trade union still requires the acknowledgment of the immediate upper-
level trade union in order to be considered lawful.31)
The new law also entitles immediate upper-level trade unions to represent and 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of workers in non-unionized enterprises at the 
workers’ request.32)  The Vietnamese government has promulgated a new decree in this 
regard.  Accordingly, the role of immediate upper-level trade unions in representing and 
protecting the rights and interests of workers in non-unionized enterprises includes: 
consulting workers on employment contracts; representing the workers’ collective to 
implement collective bargaining and monitoring the implementation of concluded collec-
tive bargaining agreements; partnering enterprises to develop and monitor the imple-
mentation of wage scales, wage tables, labor norms, wage payment regulations, bonus 
payment regulations, and work regulations; conducting dialogues with enterprises to 
settle issues concerning the lawful rights and interests of the workers; working with 
relevant organizations to guarantee labor dispute settlements in accordance with law; 
requesting settlement by the competent authority when the lawful rights and interests 
of the workers/workers’ collective are violated; representing the workers/workers’ col-
lective to request for a settlement in court when these rights and interests are violated; 
representing the workers’ collective in legal proceedings in labor, administrative and/or 
bankruptcy cases; and organizing and leading strikes.33)  Part-time trade union officers 
are granted minimum working hours for performing trade union activities.  Presidents 
and/or vice-presidents of workplace unions are entitled to at least 24 working hours per 
month; part-time trade union representatives who are members of workplace unions’ 
executive committees, heads, and deputy heads of trade union groups in charge of trade 
union activities are entitled to at least 12 working hours/month.34)
In addition, the act of preventing part-time trade union officers from using their 
working hours to undertake trade union activities; not paying them for the time they 
31) Article 2, Section 1b and Article 17, Section 1a, b, and dd of the amended VGCL’s Statute of 2013; 
and Article 5, Section 2 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
32) Article 17 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
33) Article 13, Section 1 of Decree No. 43/2013/ND-CP dated May 10, 2013, in effect since July 1, 2013, 
spelling out Article 10 of the Trade Union Law on rights and responsibilities of trade unions in 
representing and protecting the lawful and legitimate rights and interests of workers.
34) Article 24, Section 2 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
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spend on trade union activities; and excluding full-time trade union officers from benefits 
enjoyed by other workers, is now liable to a fine ranging from VND 5,000,000–10,000,000 
(around EUR 175–349 or USD 237–473).35)  The new law also provides a better protec-
tion mechanism for workers who are working as part-time workplace trade union officers. 
In the event that a part-time trade union officer’s employment contract expires while 
he/she is still serving the trade union term, the officer is entitled to prolong his/her 
contract until the end of the trade union term.36)  And for the first time, employers will 
be fined VND 10,000,000–15,000,000 (around EUR 350–524 or USD 473–710) for not 
extending the expired employment contracts in such an event.37)  Finally, if part-time 
trade union officers are illegally dismissed, trade unions can request for intervention by 
competent authorities, taking the case to court if necessary.  In the meantime, the unlaw-
fully dismissed officers will be supported by the trade unions in their search for new jobs 
and will be provided with allowances.38)
Concluding Remarks
Despite high trade union density in Vietnam, the formalistic operations of workplace 
trade unions are one of the main causes of increased labor unrest in recent years.  Trade 
union organizing free from employers’ interference is the decisive factor in enabling 
workplace trade unions to function effectively.  Recently, the VGCL implemented initia-
tives in this direction, which served as input for revising the Trade Union Law of 2012 
and the Labour Code of 2012.  The new legal framework will create more opportunities 
for immediate upper-level trade unions in dealing with enterprises.
However, there are challenges ahead, one of which is the heavy workload of full-time 
trade union officers.  Not only are they burdened by tasks irrelevant to trade union 
operations, as a consequence of the VGCL being an affiliated organization to the CPV, 
there is also a severe imbalance in the number of full-time trade union officers compared 
with the number of enterprises, workplace trade unions, and trade union members.
The new legal framework imposes stricter sanctions against anti-unionism acts 
35) Article 24, Section 2a, 2b and 2d of Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP.
36) Article 25, Section 1 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.
37) Article 24, Section 3d of Decree No. 95/2013/ND-CP.
38) Article 25, Section 3 of the Trade Union Law of 2012.  This regulation refers to Decision No. 1521/
QD-TLD dated September 29, 2006 of the VGCL Presidium, mentioned above, which provides a 
regulation on the establishment, organization, and operation of the fund for workplace trade union 
delegate support.
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committed by the employers and regulates the protection of part-time trade union officers 
at the workplace.  However, whether the new legal provisions will be strictly enforced 
in practice very much depends on the commitment of relevant authorities—the VGCL 
and its immediate upper-level trade unions—in identifying anti-unionism acts committed 
by the employers.
Another challenge lies within the VGCL itself.  A synchronous understanding and 
coherent interpretation of the VGCL’s policies among the upper-level trade unions is 
necessary if the involvement of employers in the establishment of the workplace trade 
unions is to be avoided.  Officers of the VGCL and its trade unions also need to be more 
open and ready to apply different, innovative ways of trade union organizing.
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